Tracking students in secondary education : consequences for student performance and inequality by Korthals, R.A.
  
 
Tracking students in secondary education :
consequences for student performance and inequality
Citation for published version (APA):
Korthals, R. A. (2015). Tracking students in secondary education : consequences for student performance
and inequality. Maastricht: ROA.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2015
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 135 
8 
Addendum: Valorization 
 
Chapter 8 
136 
A number of countries have changed the tracking regime for students in secondary 
education in the twentieth century (see also Chapter 6) and still every few years there 
are political and societal debates on the desirability of tracking students. This thesis 
discusses in the different chapters questions that are often leading in the political and 
societal debate on tracking: (1) Does tracking increase the average cognitive 
development? and (2) Does tracking increase inequality among students? This section 
discusses five policy recommendations following from this thesis which could aid in 
these debates, focusing on recommendations that do not require a complete overhaul 
of the education system.  
 
 To try to increase student performance in a highly tracked education system, 
society could decide to base track placement on prior performance. (Based on 
Chapter 3) 
Chapter 3 looks at whether the relation of tracking and student performance is 
different under different circumstances, namely when school principals consider prior 
performance when accepting students or not. It shows that tracking has a more positive 
relation with student performance if prior performance is taken into account. This 
suggests that using prior performance for track placement increases performance in a 
tracked system.  
 
However, Chapter 3 does not present causal evidence saying that highly tracked 
education systems that introduce track placement based on prior performance achieve 
better results after the change, but the results can be interpreted as suggestive for such 
a causal inference. Further research is needed to confirm this recommendation. 
 
 If society wants to reduce the influence of parental background on student 
performance, one possible way to do this might be by using prior achievement 
to select students into tracks. (Based on Chapter 3) 
Students in highly tracked countries that are in schools where the principal considers 
prior performance when accepting the student experience a lower effect of parental 
background than students in a comprehensive system. This is intuitive since if students 
are accepted based on prior performance the track choice of the parents is only one of 
the factors involved. Or it could be that in those systems parental choice is not even 
taken into account at all. By making it mandatory for school principals to consider 
prior performance for track placement, the influence of parents might be reduced. 
However, as Chapter 3 does not present causal evidence this recommendation is based 
on suggestive evidence only and should also be interpreted that way. 
 
 Secondary school principals in the Netherlands should be more lenient in 
accepting the marginal student to the highest track. (Based on Chapter 4) 
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Chapter 4 shows that in the Netherlands the marginal student on the threshold from 
going to the higher track (VWO) and the middle track (HAVO) performs better on a 
number of dimensions in the higher track, while it is not harmed on other dimensions, 
at least not on the dimensions looked at in this study. The students perform better on a 
reading and IQ test and they also have a more positive self-perceived probability to 
obtain the degree. No negative effects on other cognitive and non-cognitive skills were 
found. This means that there seem to be only benefits for going to the higher track for 
the marginal student. For the marginal student it would therefore be better if school 
principals are more lenient in accepting this student to the higher track. 
 
However, students who are already in the higher track might suffer negative 
consequences from allowing one extra (low performing) student to the class. In the 
sample of Chapter 4 this would mean raising the median class size from 19 to 20 and 
shifting the mean ability level somewhat down. This peer effect is not looked at in 
Chapter 4 and thus no definite answer can be given here. On the other hand, given the 
literature on peer effects it is not unreasonable to assume that allowing one extra low 
performing student to the class has a low impact on the outcomes of the other students, 
especially if the mean class ability does not decrease much from such a change 
(Sacerdote, 2011). 
 
 If society wants to reduce the influence of parental background on track 
placement, not only the influence of parents on the child should be addressed 
but also the influence of the parents on the teacher of the child. (Based on 
Chapter 5) 
Chapter 5 investigates the influence of parents on the elementary exit test score and the 
elementary school teacher track recommendation in the Netherlands. I find that on 
both performance measures there is an influence of parents over and above the general 
influence they have on their child’s ability, although only the influence on the 
recommendation seems to be very robust. The results suggest that either teachers are 
influenced by parents to provide a different recommendation than justified by the 
performance of the child, or teachers might (unconsciously) make different 
considerations for children with specific parental characteristics. The results in 
Chapter 5 show that parents have an influence on track placement through two 
channels: through their influence on their child’s ability and through an additional 
influence on the teacher recommendation. If parental influence is deemed undesirable, 
it is important to not only counteract parental influence on the ability of their children 
but also the additional parental influence on the teacher. 
 
In a broader context, the results from Chapter 5 can be seen as only one example of a 
study into the influence of parental characteristics on teachers. There is also indication 
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that teachers behave differently towards children of different parental backgrounds and 
their parents by, for instance, lowering expectations (Jussim et al., 1996) or by 
providing a specific environment most suitable for specific groups of parents (Lareau, 
1987). If parental influence is deemed undesirable by society then also these routes of 
parental influence should be addressed. 
 
 Test scores for young students should be corrected for their relative age when 
one wants to compare results across students. (Based on Chapter 6) 
Chapter 6 looks at the effect of early tracking and relative age on short and long term 
outcomes. The results show that relatively young students are more likely to go to the 
lower track and more so in countries that track early. The reasoning for this is that, as 
captured in the relative age effect, relatively young have lower student performance 
than relatively old students in the early school years. When early on students are 
selected into tracks based on this student performance and no correction for age in 
month is made, relatively young students have lower scores than relatively old 
students, are thus more often deemed to be the weaker students, and thus more likely 
to be placed in the lower track.  
 
Chapter 6 looks only at the effect of relative age and early tracking on outcomes, but 
the relative age effect itself also has an effect on outcomes, for instance by lowering 
the chances of relatively young students to go to the higher track. However, also in 
earlier stages, day to day contact between educators and children, and in different 
fields, like the sport field, the relative age effect plays a role. Due to this performance 
difference (relatively young and old) children might not be challenged or supported as 
much as they need to excel. To prevent this and to be able to accurately compare or 
rank the performance of students, performance needs to be corrected for relative age 
differences. 
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